Bournemouth, Christchurch and Poole Council (BCP) Treasury Management Strategy Statement 2020/21

Introduction

Local Government Reorganisation in Dorset

1 The treasury management strategy has been built on the latest disagregation position with Dorset Council. It is unlikely that the amount will change materially enough to impact on the strategy.

Background

2 The Council defines its treasury management activities as: “The management of the local authority’s investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks.” Part of the treasury management operation is to ensure that the cash flow is adequately planned, with cash being available when it is needed. Surplus monies are invested in low risk counterparties or instruments commensurate with the Council’s low risk appetite, providing adequate liquidity initially before considering investment return.

3 The second main function of the treasury management service is the funding of the Council’s capital plans. These capital plans provide a guide to the borrowing need of the Council, essentially the longer term cash flow planning to ensure that the Council can meet its capital spending obligations. This management of longer term cash may involve arranging long or short term loans, or using longer term cash flow surpluses. On occasion any debt previously drawn may be restructured to meet Council risk or cost objectives.

4 Revised reporting is required for the 2019/20 onwards reporting cycle due to revisions of the MHCLG Investment Guidance, the MHCLG Minimum Revenue Provision (MRP) Guidance, the CIPFA Prudential Code and the CIPFA Treasury Management Code. The primary reporting changes include the introduction of a capital strategy, to provide a longer-term focus to the capital plans, and greater reporting requirements surrounding any commercial activity undertaken under the Localism Act 2011. The capital strategy is being reported separately.

Reporting Requirements

5 **Capital Strategy** - The CIPFA revised 2017 Prudential and Treasury Management Codes require, from 2019-20, all local authorities will prepare an additional report, a capital strategy report, which will provide the following:

- a high-level long term overview of how capital expenditure, capital financing and treasury management activity contribute to the provision of services
- an overview of how the associated risk is managed
- the implications for future financial sustainability

The aim of this capital strategy is to ensure that all elected members on the full Council fully understand the overall long-term policy objectives and resulting capital strategy requirements, governance procedures and risk appetite.

This capital strategy is reported separately from the Treasury Management Strategy Statement; non-treasury investments will be reported through the former. This ensures the separation of the core treasury function under security, liquidity and yield principles, and the policy and commercialism investments usually driven by expenditure on an asset.

6 The Council is required to receive and approve, as a minimum, three main reports each year, which incorporate a variety of policies, estimates and actuals.

7 **Prudential and treasury indicators and treasury strategy** - The first, and most important report covers:

a The capital plans (including prudential indicators);

b A minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy (how residual capital expenditure is charged to revenue over time);

c The treasury management strategy (how the investments and borrowings are to be organised) including treasury indicators; and

d An investment strategy (the parameters on how investments are to be managed).

8 **Quarterly treasury management report** – This will update members with the progress of the capital position, amending prudential indicators if necessary, and whether any policies require revision. This role is undertaken by the Audit and Governance Commitee.

9 **An annual treasury management report** – This provides details of a selection of actual prudential and treasury indicators and actual treasury operations compared to the estimates within the strategy.

10 The above reports are required to be adequately scrutinised before being recommended to the Council. This role is undertaken by the Audit and Governance Commitee.

Treasury Management Strategy for 2020/21

11 The strategy for 2020/21 covers two main areas:

Capital issues

- the capital plans and the prudential indicators;
- the minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy.

Treasury management issues

- the current treasury position;
- treasury indicators which limit the treasury risk and activities of the Council;
- prospects for interest rates;
- the borrowing strategy;
- policy on borrowing in advance of need;
- debt rescheduling;
- the investment strategy;
- creditworthiness policy; and

- policy on use of external service providers.

12 These elements cover the requirements of the Local Government Act 2003, the CIPFA Prudential Code, MHCLG MRP Guidance, the CIPFA Treasury Management Code and MHCLG Investment Guidance.

Training

13 The CIPFA Code requires the responsible officer to ensure that members with responsibility for treasury management receive adequate training in treasury management. This especially applies to members responsibe for scrutiny. Training was provided to all members on the 7th January 2020 with support from the Councils Treasury Management advisors. It is not envisaged that more training will be required in 2020/21.

14 The training needs of treasury management officers are periodically reviewed.

Treasury management consultants

15 The Councils Treasury Management advisors are Link Asset Services.

16 The Council recognises that responsibility for treasury management decisions remains with the organisation at all times and will ensure that undue reliance is not placed upon our external service providers. It also recognises that there is value in employing external providers of treasury management services in order to acquire access to specialist skills and resources.

The Capital Prudential Indicators 2020/21 – 2022/23

17 The Council's capital expenditure plans have a key influence over the treasury management activity. The capital expenditure plans are reflected in the prudential indicators, which are designed to assist members' in considering the impact and risk of this Council's capital expenditure plans.

Capital expenditure

18 This prudential indicator is a summary of the Council's capital expenditure plans, both those agreed previously, and those forming part of this budget cycle. Members are asked to approve the capital expenditure forecasts:

Capital expenditure	2019/20 Estimate £'000	2020/21 Estimate £'000	2021/22 Estimate £'000	2022/23 Estimate £'000
General Fund	72,701	87,918	30,012	16,776
Commercial activities/ non-financial investments	-	-	-	-
HRA	23,943	39,532	53,191	44,446
Total	**96,644**	**127,450**	**83,203**	**61,222**

* Commercial activities / non-financial investments relate to areas such as capital expenditure on investment properties, loans to third parties etc.

19 The following tables summarise the above capital expenditure plans and how these plans are being financed by capital or revenue resources. Any shortfall of resources results in a funding borrowing need.

General Fund and Commercial Activity Capital Expenditure

Capital expenditure	2019/20 Estimate £'000	2020/21 Estimate £'000	2021/22 Estimate £'000	2022/23 Estimate £'000
General Fund Total	**72,701**	**87,918**	**30,012**	**16,776**
Financed by:				
Capital receipts	2,912	-	495	-
Capital grants & Contributions	36,664	49,574	16,031	9,056
Revenue Contributions	1,167	5,669	997	997
Reserve Contributions	8,429	8,527	1,296	538
Internal Borrowing	23,529	24,148	11,193	6,185
External Borrowing	-	-	-	-
Total financing for the year	**72,701**	**87,918**	**30,012**	**16,776**

HRA Capital Expenditure

Capital expenditure	2019/20 Estimate £'000	2020/21 Estimate £'000	2021/22 Estimate £'000	2022/23 Estimate £'000
HRA Total	**23,943**	**39,532**	**53,191**	**44,446**
Financed by:				
Capital receipts	2,587	4,268	8,534	6,414
Major Repairs Allowance	14,558	21,519	13,190	13,238
Other Contributions	4,688	8,161	9,102	8,700
Internal Borrowing	2,110	5,584	22,365	16,094
External Borrowing	0	-	-	-
Total financing for the year	**23,943**	**39,532**	**53,191**	**44,446**

The Council’s borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement)

20 The second prudential indicator is the Council’s Capital Financing Requirement (CFR). The CFR is simply the total historic outstanding capital expenditure which has not yet been paid for from either revenue or capital resources. It is essentially a measure of the Council’s underlying borrowing need. Any capital expenditure above, which has not immediately been paid for, will increase the CFR.

21 The CFR does not increase indefinitely, as the minimum revenue provision (MRP) is a statutory annual revenue charge which broadly reduces the borrowing need in line with each asset’s life, and so charges the economic consumption of capital assets as they are used.

22 The CFR includes any other long-term liabilities (e.g. PFI schemes, finance leases). Whilst these increase the CFR, and therefore the Council’s borrowing

requirement, these types of scheme include a borrowing facility and so the Council is not required to separately borrow for these schemes.

23 The Council is asked to approve the CFR projections overleaf:

	2019/20 Estimate £'000	2020/21 Estimate £'000	2021/22 Estimate £'000	2022/23 Estimate £'000
Capital Financing Requirement				
CFR – General Fund	309,797	324,330	325,610	321,882
CFR – HRA	142,055	147,639	170,004	186,098
CFR - IAS16 leases estimated impact	-	6,754	6,754	6,754
Total CFR	**451,852**	**478,723**	**502,368**	**514,734**
Movement in CFR	16,723	26,871	23,645	12,366
Movement in CFR represented by				
Net movement in borrowing for the year (above)	25,639	29,732	33,558	22,279
CFR - IAS16 leases estimated impact	0	6,754		
Less MRP/VRP and other financing movements	(8,916)	(9,615)	(9,913)	(9,913)
Movement in CFR	**16,723**	**26,871**	**23,645**	**12,366**

24 A key aspect of the regulatory and professional guidance is that elected members are aware of the size and scope of any commercial activity in relation to the authority's overall financial position. The capital expenditure figures and the details above demonstrate the scope of this activity and, by approving these figures, consider the scale proportionate to the Council's remaining activity.

Minimum Revenue Provision (MRP) policy statement

25 The Council is required to make a Minimum Revenue Provision (MRP). It is a statutory requirement to make a charge to the Council's General Fund to make provision for the repayment of the Council's past capital debt and other credit liabilities.

26 MHCLG regulations have been issued which require the full Council to approve an MRP Statement in advance of each year. A variety of options are provided to Councils, so long as there is a prudent provision. The Council is recommended to approve the following MRP Statement.

27 For capital expenditure incurred before 1 April 2008 or which in the future will be Supported Capital Expenditure, the MRP policy will be either:

- **Existing practice -** MRP will follow the existing practice outlined in former CLG regulations (option 1);
- **Based on CFR** – MRP will be based on the CFR (option 2);

28 These options provide for an approximate 4% reduction in the borrowing need (CFR) each year.

29 From 1 April 2008 for all unsupported borrowing (including PFI and finance leases) the MRP policy will be either:

- **Asset life method** – MRP will be based on the estimated life of the assets, in accordance with the regulations (this option must be applied for any expenditure capitalised under a Capitalisation Direction) (option 3);
- **Depreciation method** – MRP will follow standard depreciation accounting procedures (option 4);

30 The type of approach intended by the MRP guidance is clearly to enable local circumstances and discretion to play a part, as the guidance in general contains a set of recommendations rather than representing a prescriptive process. The guidance makes it clear that Councils can follow an alternative approach, provided they still make a prudent provision.

31 It was agreed by members of previous Councils that the following MRP policy was applied from 2016/17 onwards:

- In respect of all supported borrowing, capital expenditure incurred prior to 2016/17 (excluding assets acquired under PFI or finance lease arrangements) MRP will be provided at a rate of 2% on a straight-line basis to ensure the balance is fully cleared over the period in line with the useful life of the assets.
- In respect of all unsupported borrowing, capital expenditure incurred prior to 2016/17 (excluding assets acquired under PFI or finance lease arrangements) the Council will apply the Asset life method as used in previous years and will apply an average life of 25 years for the unsupported borrowing requirement to be repaid over based on historical schemes that have required and applied unsupported borrowing.
- MRP charges from 1 April 2004 to 31 March 2016 exceeded what prudence required during the period under this revised policy. There will be a realignment of MRP charged to the revenue account in 2016/17 and subsequent years to recognise this excess sum. Total MRP after applying realignment will not be less than zero in any financial year.
- In respect of capital expenditure incurred in 2016/17 and subsequent financial years MRP will be provided at a rate of 4% on the written down balance.

32 In 2017/18 a proposed change was made that the 4% write down method will be used for all assets except for significant individual schemes exceeding £10m (such as asset investments) for which the specific asset life will be used for MRP purposes. To allow for further flexibility in the Council MRP policy the Council will look at using specific asset life for individual schemes which are deemed strategically important for the Council but are below £10m. It will be for the S151 officer to determine was it is strategically important.

33 There is no requirement on the HRA to make a minimum revenue provision but there is a requirement for a charge for depreciation to be made (although there are transitional arrangements in place).

34 Repayments included in annual PFI or finance leases are applied as MRP.

MRP Overpayments

35 A change introduced by the revised MHCLG MRP Guidance was the allowance that any charges made over the statutory minimum revenue provision (MRP), voluntary revenue provision or overpayments, can, if needed, be reclaimed in later years if deemed necessary or prudent. In order for these sums to be reclaimed for use in the budget, this policy must disclose the cumulative overpayment made each year. Up until the 31 December 2019 the total VRP overpayments were £4.5m. Decision by previous authorities have earmarked a significant proportion of this for the Oakdale capital scheme. The Councils S151 officer will give ongoing consideration what will be prudent to release in future years.

Borrowing

36 The treasury management function ensures that the Council's cash is organised in accordance with the relevant professional codes, so that sufficient cash is available to meet this service activity. This will involve both the organisation of the cash flow and, where capital plans require, the organisation of appropoperiate borrowing facilities. The strategy covers the relevant treasury / prudential indicators, the current and projected debt positions and the annual investment strategy.

Current portfolio position

37 The overall Treasury Management portfolio as at 31 March 2019 and for the position as at 31 December 2019 are shown below for both borrowing and investments.

Treasury investments	**Actual 31/03/2019 £'000**	**Actual 31/03/2019 %**	**Current 31/12/2019 £'000**	**Current 31/12/2019 %**
Money Market Funds	7,600	14%	4,150	12%
Bank Deposits	4,228	8%	15,000	44%
Local Authorities	7,500	14%	0	0%
DMO	10,800	19%	0	0%
Call Account	0	0%	4,700	14%
Cash Plus and Short Bond Funds	25,000	45%	10,000	30%
Total Treasury Investments	**55,128**	**100%**	**33,850**	**100%**
Treasury External Borrowing				
PWLB	152,771	61%	152,562	77%
Local Authorities	78,900	31%	25,000	13%
Private Sector	18,508	7%	17,967	9%
Salix	1,749	1%	1,016	1%
Total External Borrowing	**251,928**	**100%**	**196,545**	**100%**
Net treasury investment / (borrowing)	**(196,800)**		**(162,695)**	

38 It should be noted that Bournemouth Borough Council secured a £49m forward loan which will be issued to BCP Council in May 2021.

39 The Council's forward projections for borrowing are summarised on the next page. The table shows the actual external debt (the treasury management operations), against the underlying capital borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement - CFR), highlighting any over or under borrowing.

	2019/20 Estimate £'000	2020/21 Estimate £'000	2021/22 Estimate £'000	2022/23 Estimate £'000
External Debt				
Debt at 1 April	**251,928**	**250,928**	**230,928**	**279,928**
Expected change in Debt	(1,000)	(20,000)	49,000	0
Actual gross debt at 31 March	**250,928**	**230,928**	**279,928**	**279,928**
The Capital Financing Requirement	**451,851**	**471,968**	**495,613**	**507,979**
Under / (over) borrowing	**200,923**	**241,040**	**215,685**	**228,051**

40 Within the prudential indicators there are a number of key indicators to ensure that the Council operates its activities within well defined limits. One of these is that the Council needs to ensure that its gross debt does not, except in the short term, exceed the total of the CFR in the preceding year plus the estimates of any additional CFR for the current year and the following two financial years. This allows some flexibility for limited early borrowing for future years, but ensures that borrowing is not undertaken for revenue purposes.

41 The Council has complied with their prudential indicator in the current year and does not envisage difficulties for the future due to the large under borrowing requirement. This view considers current commitments, existing plans, and the proposals in this budget report.

Treasury Indicators: limits to borrowing activity

42 **The operational boundary.** This is the limit beyond which external debt is not normally expected to exceed. In most cases, this would be a similar figure to the CFR, but may be lower or higher depending on the levels of actual debt.

43 **The authorised limit for external debt.** A further key prudential indicator represents a control on the maximum level of borrowing. This represents a limit beyond which external debt is prohibited, and this limit needs to be set or revised by the full Council. It reflects the level of external debt which, while not desired, could be afforded in the short term, but is not sustainable in the longer term.

a This is the statutory limit determined under section 3 (1) of the Local Government Act 2003. The Government retains an option to control either the total of all Councils' plans, or those of a specific Council, although this power has not yet been exercised.

b The Audit and Governance Committee is asked to approve the following authorised limit:

	2019/20 Estimate £m	2020/21 Estimate £m	2021/22 Estimate £m	2022/23 Estimate £m
Operational boundary	460	550	600	600
Authorised limit	510	600	650	650

Prospects for interest rates

44 Link Asset Services as part of their service is to assist the Council to formulate a view on interest rates. The following table gives their view on the base rate and PWLB borrowing costs.

Link Asset Services Interest Rate View	Dec-19	Mar-20	Jun-20	Sep-20	Dec-20	Mar-21	Jun-21	Sep-21	Dec-21	Mar-22	Jun-22	Sep-22	Dec-22	Mar-23
Bank Rate View	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25
3 Month LIBID	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.80	0.90	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.10	1.20	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30
6 Month LIBID	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.90	1.00	1.10	1.10	1.20	1.30	1.40	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50
12 Month LIBID	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.10	1.20	1.30	1.30	1.40	1.50	1.60	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70
5yr PWLB Rate	2.30	2.40	2.40	2.50	2.50	2.60	2.70	2.80	2.90	2.90	3.00	3.10	3.20	3.20
10yr PWLB Rate	2.60	2.70	2.70	2.70	2.80	2.90	3.00	3.10	3.20	3.20	3.30	3.30	3.40	3.50
25yr PWLB Rate	3.20	3.30	3.40	3.40	3.50	3.60	3.70	3.70	3.80	3.90	4.00	4.00	4.10	4.10
50yr PWLB Rate	3.10	3.20	3.30	3.30	3.40	3.50	3.60	3.60	3.70	3.80	3.90	3.90	4.00	4.00

45 The above forecasts have been based on an assumption that there is an agreed deal on Brexit, including agreement on the terms of trade between the UK and the EU, at some point in time. The result of the general election has removed much uncertainty around this major assumption. However, it does not remove uncertainty around whether agreement can be reached with the EU on a trade deal within the short time to December 2020, as the prime minister has pledged.

46 It has been little surprise that the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) left Bank Rate unchanged at 0.75% in 2019 due to the ongoing uncertainty over Brexit and the outcome of the general election. In its meeting on 7 November, the MPC became more dovish due to increased concerns over the outlook for the domestic economy if Brexit uncertainties were to become more entrenched, and for weak global economic growth: if those uncertainties were to materialise, then the MPC were likely to cut Bank Rate. However, if they were both to dissipate, then rates would need to rise at a "gradual pace and to a limited extent". Brexit uncertainty has had a dampening effect on UK GDP growth in 2019, especially around mid-year. There is still some residual risk that the MPC could cut Bank Rate as the UK economy is still likely to only grow weakly in 2020 due to continuing uncertainty over whether there could effectively be a no deal Brexit in December 2020 if agreement on a trade deal is not reached with the EU. Until that major uncertainty is removed, or the period for agreeing a deal is extended, it is unlikely that the MPC would raise Bank Rate.

Borrowing strategy

47 The Council is currently maintaining an under-borrowed position. This means that the capital borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement), has not been fully funded with loan debt as cash supporting the Council's reserves, balances and cash flow have been used as a temporary measure. This strategy is prudent as investment returns are low and counterparty risk is still an issue that need to be considered.

48 The Chief Financial Officer has the delegated responsibility to arrange such loans as are legally permitted to meet the Council's borrowing requirement and to arrange terms of all loans to the Council including amounts, periods and rates of interest.

49 Against this background and the risks within the economic forecast, caution will be

adopted with the 2020/21 treasury operations. The Chief Financial Officer will monitor interest rates in financial markets and adopt a pragmatic approach to changing circumstances:

a. if it was felt that there was a significant risk of a sharp FALL in borrowing rates, (e.g. due to a marked increase of risks around relapse into recession or of risks of deflation), then borrowing will be postponed.

b. if it was felt that there was a significant risk of a much sharper RISE in borrowing rates than that currently forecast, perhaps arising from an acceleration in the rate of increase in central rates in the USA and UK, an increase in world economic activity, or a sudden increase in inflation risks, then the portfolio position will be re-appraised. Most likely, fixed rate funding will be drawn whilst interest rates are lower than they are projected to be in the next few years.

Policy on borrowing in advance of need

50 The Council will not borrow more than or in advance of its needs purely in order to profit from the investment of the extra sums borrowed. Any decision to borrow in advance will be within forward approved Capital Financing Requirement estimates, and will be considered carefully to ensure that value for money can be demonstrated and that the Council can ensure the security of such funds.

51 Risks associated with any borrowing in advance of activity will be subject to prior appraisal and subsequent reporting through the mid-year or annual reporting mechanism.

Debt rescheduling

52 As short term borrowing rates will be considerably cheaper than longer term fixed interest rates, there may be potential opportunities to generate savings by switching from long term debt to short term debt. However, these savings will need to be considered in the light of the current treasury position and the size of the cost of debt repayment (premiums incurred).

53 The reasons for any rescheduling to take place will include:

a The generation of cash savings and / or discounted cash flow savings;

b Helping to fulfil the treasury strategy;

c Enhance the balance of the portfolio (amend the maturity profile and/or the balance of volatility).

54 Consideration will also be given to identify if there is any residual potential for making savings by running down investment balances to repay debt prematurely as short term rates on investments are likely to be lower than rates paid on current debt.

55 All debt rescheduling will be reported to the Audit and Governance committee for the BCP authority at the earliest meeting following its action.

New financial institutions as a source of borrowing and / or types of borrowing

56 Following the decision by the PWLB on 9 October 2019 to increase their margin over gilt yields by 100 bps to 180 basis points on loans lent to local authorities, consideration will also need to be given to sourcing funding at cheaper rates from the following:

- Local authorities (primarily shorter dated maturities)
- Financial institutions (primarily insurance companies and pension funds but also some banks, out of spot or forward dates)
- Municipal Bonds Agency (no issuance at present but there is potential)

57 The degree which any of these options proves cheaper than PWLB Certainty Rate is still evolving at the time of writing but our advisors will keep us informed.

Approved Sources of Long- and Short-term Borrowing

On Balance Sheet	Fixed	Variable
PWLB	●	●
Municipal bond agency	●	●
Local authorities	●	●
Banks	●	●
Pension funds	●	●
Insurance companies	●	●
Market (long-term)	●	●
Market (temporary)	●	●
Market (LOBOs)	●	●
Stock issues	●	●
Local temporary	●	●
Local Bonds	●	
Local authority bills	●	●
Overdraft		●
Negotiable Bonds	●	●
Internal (capital receipts & revenue balances)	●	●
Commercial Paper	●	
Medium Term Notes	●	
Finance leases	●	●

Annual Investment Strategy

Investment Policy

58 The MHCLG and CIPFA have extended the meaning of 'investments' to include both financial and non-financial investments. This report deals solely with financial investments, (as managed by the treasury management team). Non-financial investments, essentially the purchase of income yielding assets, are covered in the Capital Strategy, (a separate report).

59 The Council's investment policy has regard to the following: -

- MHCLG's Guidance on Local Government Investments ("the Guidance")
- CIPFA Treasury Management in Public Services Code of Practice and Cross Sectoral Guidance Notes 2017 ("the Code")
- CIPFA Treasury Management Guidance Notes 2018

The Council's investment priorities will be security first, portfolio liquidity second and then yield, (return).

60 In accordance with the above guidance from the MHCLG and CIPFA, and in order to minimise the risk to investments, the Council applies minimum acceptable credit criteria in order to generate a list of highly creditworthy counterparties which also enables diversification and thus avoidance of concentration risk. The key ratings used to monitor counterparties are the Short Term and Long Term ratings.

61 Ratings will not be the sole determinant of the quality of an institution; it is important to continually assess and monitor the financial sector on both a micro and macro basis and in relation to the economic and political environments in which institutions operate. The assessment will also take account of information that reflects the opinion of the markets. To this end the Council will engage with its advisors to maintain a monitor on market pricing such as "credit default swaps" and overlay that information on top of the credit ratings.

62 Other information sources used will include the financial press, share price and other such information pertaining to the banking sector in order to establish the most robust scrutiny process on the suitability of potential investment counterparties.

Creditworthiness policy

63 The primary principle governing the Council's investment criteria is the security of its investments, although the yield or return on the investment is also a key consideration. After this main principle, the Council will ensure that:

a It maintains a policy covering both the categories of investment types it will invest in, criteria for choosing investment counterparties with adequate security, and monitoring their security. This is set out in the specified and non-specified investment sections below; and

b It has sufficient liquidity in its investments. For this purpose, it will set out procedures for determining the maximum periods for which funds may prudently be committed. These procedures also apply to the Council's prudential indicators covering the maximum principal sums invested.

64 The Chief Financial Officer will maintain a counterparty list in compliance with the following criteria and will revise the criteria and submit them to Council for approval as necessary. These criteria are separate to which types of investment instruments that can be used as it provides an overall pool of counterparties considered high quality which the Council may use, rather than defining what types of investment instruments are to be used.

65 Credit rating information is supplied by Link Asset Services, our treasury consultants, on all active counterparties that comply with the criteria below. Any counterparty failing to meet the criteria would be omitted from the counterparty (dealing) list. Any rating changes, rating watches (notification of a likely change), rating outlooks (notification of a possible longer-term change) are provided to officers almost immediately after they occur, and this information is considered before dealing. For instance, a negative rating watch applying to a counterparty at the minimum Council criteria will be suspended from use, with all others being reviewed in light of market conditions.

66 The criteria for providing a pool of high-quality investment counterparties (both specified and non-specified investments) is:

Sovereign Ratings

- AAA (non-UK)

(Rating Description: AAA = Prime Rating, AA+, AA, AA- = High Grade Rating)

Appendix 2 sets out the current list of countries that the Council can invest funds with.

The UK sovereign rating is currently AA. To ensure that the Treasury Function has capacity to operate effectively no specific minimum UK sovereign rating has been set out.

Selection Criteria

67 Banks 1 - the Council will use UK and non-UK banks which have, as a minimum at least one of, the following Fitch, Moody's and Standard & Poors credit ratings (where rated):

	Fitch	**Moody's**	**Standard & Poors**
Short Term	F1	P1	A-1
Long Term	A-	A3	A-

68 Investments will include term deposits, call accounts, notice accounts and Certificate of Deposits.

a Banks 2 – Part nationalised UK bank – Royal Bank of Scotland. This bank can be included provided it continues to be part nationalised or it meets the ratings in Banks 1 above.

b Banks 3 – The Council's own bankers (HSBC, Lloyds and Barclays) for transactional purposes if the bank falls below the above criteria, although in this case balances will be minimised in both monetary size and time.

c Bank subsidiary and treasury operation - The Council will use these where the parent bank has provided an appropriate guarantee or has the necessary ratings outlined above.

d Building societies. The Council will use societies which meet the ratings for Banks 1 outlined above.

e Money Market Funds (MMFs) Constant net asset value (CNAV)

f Money Market Funds (MMFs) Low-Volatility net asset value (LVNAV)

g Money Market Funds (MMFs) Variable net asset value (VNAV)

h Ultra-Short Dated Bond Funds with a credit rating of at least 1.25

i Ultra-Short Dated Bond Funds with a credit rating of at least 1.50

j Cash Plus Funds

k UK Government (including gilts, Treasury Bills and the Debt Management Account Deposit Facility (DMADF)) l Royal Bournemouth and Christchurch Hospital NHS Foundation trusts

m Local authorities, Parish Councils, BCP Council Companies (Subsidiaries) and Partnerships.

n Pooled Funds

Maximum Time and Monetary Limits applying to Investments

69 The maximum amount that can be invested in any one institution at the time of the investment (including call accounts) as a percentage of the total investment portfolio has been reviewed and rationalised. All AA- and above rated institutions have a maximum limit of 25%, all A+, A or A- rated institutions have a maximum limit of 20%. For practical reasons where the average investment balance falls below £10m it may become necessary to increase the percentage limit to 33% at the time of investment (this only applies to call accounts and money market funds).

70 The maximum time and monetary limits for institutions on the Council's Counterparty List are as follows (these will cover both Specified and Non-Specified Investments):

	Long Term Rating	Money Limit	Time Limit
Banks 1 higher quality	AA-	25%	2 years
Banks 1 medium quality	A	20%	1 year
Banks 1 lower quality	A-	20%	6 months
Banks 2 category – part-nationalised RBS / Nat West	N/A	20%	2 years
Banks 3 category – Council's banker HSBC	AA-	25%	3 months
DMADF/Treasury Bills	AAA	25%	6 months
Local Authorities	N/A	20%	5 years
Royal Bournemouth and Christchurch Hospital NHS Foundation Trusts	N/A	Fixed investment £14.9m	15 years
Money Market Funds CNAV	AAA	25%	Instant access
Money Market Funds LVNAV	AAA	25%	Instant access
Money Market Funds VNAV	AAA	25%	Instant access

Ultra-Short Dated Bond Funds	N/A	25%	Unlimited
Cash Plus Funds	AAA	25%	Unlimited
UK Gilts	UK Sovereign Rate	25%	5 years

Use of additional information other than credit ratings

71 Additional requirements under the Code require the Council to supplement credit rating information. Whilst the above criteria relies primarily on the application of credit ratings to provide a pool of appropriate counterparties for officers to use, additional operational market information will be applied before making any specific investment decision from the agreed pool of counterparties. This additional market information will be applied to compare the relative security of differing investment counterparties.

Investment strategy

In-house funds

72 Investments will be made with reference to the core balance and cash flow requirements and the outlook for short-term interest rates (i.e. rates for investments up to 12 months).

Investment returns expectations

73 Bank Rate is forecast to increase steadily but slowly over the next few years to reach 1% by quarter 1 2022. Bank Rate forecasts for financial year ends (March) are:

a 2019/20 0.75%
b 2020/21 1.00%
c 2021/22 1.00%
d 2022/23 1.25%

74 The overall balance of risks to economic growth in the UK is probably neutral. The balance of risks to increases in Bank Rate and shorter term PWLB rates, are probably also even and are dependent on how strong GDP growth turns out, how slowly inflation pressures subside, and how quickly the Brexit negotiations move forward positively.

75 **Investment treasury limit** – The maximum period for investments will be 5 years except the Royal Bournemouth and Christchurch Hospital NHS Foundation Trusts investment.

Ethical Investing

76 This is an area of investing that is becoming increasingly considered by financial institutions and customers. Products from financial institutions are growing but still remain limited. To consider investing in sustainable deposits they will still need to meet our counterparty criteria and parameters set out earlier in the strategy. Investment guidance, both statutory and from CIPFA, makes clear that all investing must adopt SLY principles – security, liquidity and yield: ethical issues

must play a subordinate role to those priorities. The Treasury team will continue to explore this area and report to members of any further developments.

Treasury Management Policy, Practices and Schedules

77 The Treasury Management Policy, Practices and Schedules remain unchanged from those presented alongside the 2019/20 budget process. These rarely change and any significant changes will be reported to Audit and Governance before implementation.

Appendices

Appendix 1 - Economic Background and interest rate forecasts

Appendix 2 - Approved Countries for investments

APPENDIX 5

Appendix 1: Economic Background (provided by Link Asset Services)

UK. Brexit. 2019 has been a year of upheaval on the political front as Theresa May resigned as Prime Minister to be replaced by Boris Johnson on a platform of the UK leaving the EU on 31 October 2019, with or without a deal. However, MPs blocked leaving on that date and the EU agreed an extension to 31 January 2020. In late October, MPs approved an outline of a Brexit deal to enable the UK to leave the EU on 31 January. Now that the Conservative Government has gained a large overall majority in the **general election** on 12 December, this outline deal will be passed by Parliament by that date. However, there will still be much uncertainty as the detail of a trade deal will need to be negotiated by the current end of the transition period in December 2020, which the Prime Minister has pledged he will not extend. This could prove to be an unrealistically short timetable for such major negotiations that leaves open two possibilities; one, the need for an extension of negotiations, probably two years, or, a no deal Brexit in December 2020.

GDP growth has taken a hit from Brexit uncertainty during 2019; quarter three 2019 surprised on the upside by coming in at +0.4% q/q, +1.1% y/y. However, the peak of Brexit uncertainty during the final quarter appears to have suppressed quarterly growth to probably around zero. The economy is likely to tread water in 2020, with tepid growth around about 1% until there is more certainty after the trade deal deadline is passed.

While the Bank of England went through the routine of producing another **quarterly Inflation Report,** (now renamed the Monetary Policy Report), on 7 November, it is very questionable how much all the writing and numbers were worth when faced with the uncertainties of where the UK will be after the general election. The Bank made a change in their Brexit assumptions to now include a deal being eventually passed. Possibly the biggest message that was worth taking note of from the Monetary Policy Report, was an increase in concerns among MPC members around weak global economic growth and the potential for Brexit uncertainties to become entrenched and so delay UK economic recovery. Consequently, the MPC voted 7-2 to maintain Bank Rate at 0.75% but two members were sufficiently concerned to vote for an immediate Bank Rate cut to 0.5%. The MPC warned that if global growth does not pick up or Brexit uncertainties intensify, then a rate cut was now more likely. Conversely, if risks do recede, then a more rapid recovery of growth will require gradual and limited rate rises. The speed of recovery will depend on the extent to which uncertainty dissipates over the final terms for trade between the UK and EU and by how much global growth rates pick up. The Bank revised its inflation forecasts down – to 1.25% in 2019, 1.5% in 2020, and 2.0% in 2021; hence, the MPC views inflation as causing little concern in the near future.

The **MPC meeting of 19 December** repeated the previous month's vote of 7-2 to keep Bank Rate on hold. Their key view was that there was currently 'no evidence about the extent to which policy uncertainties among companies and households had declined' i.e. they were going to sit on their hands and see how the economy goes in the next few months. The two members who voted for a cut were concerned that the labour market was faltering. On the other hand, there was a clear warning in the minutes that the MPC were concerned that domestic "unit labour costs have continued to grow at rates above those consistent with meeting the inflation target in the medium term".

If economic growth were to weaken considerably, the MPC has relatively little room to make a big impact with Bank Rate still only at 0.75%. It would therefore, probably suggest that it would be up to the Chancellor to provide help to support growth by way of a **fiscal boost** by e.g. tax cuts, increases in the annual expenditure budgets of government departments and services and expenditure on infrastructure projects, to boost the economy. The Government has already made moves in this direction and it made significant promises in its election manifesto to increase government spending by up to £20bn p.a., (this would add about 1% to GDP growth rates), by investing primarily in infrastructure. This is likely to be announced in the next Budget, probably in March 2020. The Chancellor has also amended the fiscal rules in November to allow for an increase in government expenditure.

As for **inflation** itself, CPI has been hovering around the Bank of England's target of 2% during 2019 but fell again in both October and November to a three-year low of 1.5%. It is likely to remain close to or under 2% over the next two years and so it does not pose any immediate concern to the MPC at the current time. However, if there was a hard or no deal Brexit, inflation could rise towards 4%, primarily because of imported inflation on the back of a weakening pound.

With regard to the **labour market,** growth in numbers employed has been quite resilient through 2019 until the three months to September where it fell by 58,000. However, there was an encouraging pick up again in the three months to October to growth of 24,000 which showed that the labour market was not about to head into a major downturn. The unemployment rate held steady at a 44 year low of 3.8% on the Independent Labour Organisation measure in October. Wage inflation has been steadily falling from a high point of 3.9% in July to 3.5% in October (3-month average regular pay, excluding bonuses). This meant that in real terms, (i.e. wage rates higher than CPI inflation), earnings grew by about 2.0%. As the UK economy is very much services sector driven, an increase in household spending power is likely to feed through into providing some support to the overall rate of economic growth in the coming months. The other message from the fall in wage growth is that employers are beginning to find it easier to hire suitable staff, indicating that supply pressure in the labour market is easing.

USA. President Trump's massive easing of fiscal policy in 2018 fuelled a temporary boost in consumption in that year which generated an upturn in the rate of growth to a robust 2.9% y/y. **Growth** in 2019 has been falling after a strong start in quarter 1 at 3.1%, (annualised rate), to 2.0% in quarter 2 and then 2.1% in quarter 3. The economy looks likely to have maintained a growth rate similar to quarter 3 into quarter 4; fears of a recession have largely dissipated. The strong growth in employment numbers during 2018 has weakened during 2019, indicating that the economy had been cooling, while inflationary pressures were also weakening. However; CPI inflation rose from 1.8% to 2.1% in November, a one year high, but this was singularly caused by a rise in gasoline prices.

The Fed finished its series of increases in rates to 2.25 – 2.50% in December 2018. In July 2019, it cut rates by 0.25% as a 'midterm adjustment' but flagged up that this was not intended to be seen as the start of a series of cuts to ward off a downturn in growth. It also ended its programme of quantitative tightening in August, (reducing its holdings of treasuries etc). It then cut rates by 0.25% again in September and by another 0.25% in its October meeting to 1.50 – 1.75%. At its September meeting it also said it was going to **start buying Treasuries again**, although this was not to be seen as a resumption of quantitative easing but rather an exercise to relieve liquidity pressures in the repo market. Despite those protestations, this still means that the Fed is again expanding its balance sheet holdings of government debt. In the first month, it will buy $60bn, whereas it had been reducing its balance sheet by $50bn per month during 2019. As it will be buying only short-term (under 12 months) Treasury bills, it is technically correct that this is not quantitative easing (which is purchase of long-term debt). The Fed left rates unchanged in December. However, the accompanying statement was more optimistic about the future course of the economy, so this would indicate that further cuts are unlikely.

Investor confidence has been badly rattled by the progressive ramping up of increases in tariffs President Trump has made on Chinese imports and China has responded with increases in tariffs on American imports. This **trade war** is seen as depressing US, Chinese and world growth. In the EU, it is also particularly impacting Germany as exports of goods and services are equivalent to 46% of total GDP. It will also impact developing countries dependent on exporting commodities to China.
However, in November / December, progress has been made on agreeing a phase one deal

between the US and China to roll back some of the tariffs; this gives some hope of resolving this dispute.

EUROZONE. Growth has been slowing from +1.8 % during 2018 to around half of that in 2019. Growth was +0.4% q/q (+1.2% y/y) in quarter 1, +0.2% q/q (+1.2% y/y) in quarter 2 and then +0.2% q/q, +1.1% in quarter 3; there appears to be little upside potential in the near future. German GDP growth has been struggling to stay in positive territory in 2019 and fell by -0.1% in quarter 2; industrial production was down 4% y/y in June with car production down 10% y/y. Germany would be particularly vulnerable to a no deal Brexit depressing exports further and if President Trump imposes tariffs on EU produced cars.

The European Central Bank (ECB) ended its programme of quantitative easing purchases of debt in December 2018, which then meant that the central banks in the US, UK and EU had all ended the phase of post financial crisis expansion of liquidity supporting world financial markets by quantitative easing purchases of debt. However, the downturn in EZ growth in the second half of 2018 and into 2019, together with inflation falling well under the upper limit of its target range of 0 to 2%, (but it aims to keep it near to 2%), has prompted the ECB to take new measures to stimulate growth. At its March meeting it said that it expected to leave interest rates at their present levels “at least through the end of 2019”, but that was of little help to boosting growth in the near term. Consequently, it announced a **third round of TLTROs**; this provides banks with cheap borrowing every three months from September 2019 until March 2021 that means that, although they will have only a two-year maturity, the Bank was making funds available until 2023, two years later than under its previous policy. As with the last round, the new TLTROs will include an incentive to encourage bank lending, and they will be capped at 30% of a bank’s eligible loans. However, since then, the downturn in EZ and world growth has gathered momentum; at its meeting on 12 September, it cut its deposit rate further into negative territory, from -0.4% to -0.5%, and announced a **resumption of quantitative easing purchases of debt for an unlimited period;** (at its October meeting it said this would start in November at €20bn per month - a relatively small amount compared to the previous buying programme). It also increased the maturity of the third round of TLTROs from two to three years. However, it is doubtful whether this loosening of monetary policy will have much impact on growth and, unsurprisingly, the ECB stated that governments will need to help stimulate growth by ‘growth friendly’ fiscal policy.

There were no policy changes in the December meeting which was chaired for the first time by the new President of the ECB, Christine Lagarde. However, the outlook continued to be down beat about the economy; this makes it likely there will be further monetary policy stimulus to come in 2020. She did also announce a thorough review of how the ECB conducts monetary policy, including the price stability target. This review is likely to take all of 2020.

On the political front, Austria, Spain and Italy have been in the throes of **forming coalition governments** with some unlikely combinations of parties i.e. this raises questions around their likely endurance. The latest results of German state elections has put further pressure on the frail German CDU/SDP coalition government and on the current leadership of the CDU. The results of the Spanish general election in November have not helped the prospects of forming a stable coalition.

CHINA. Economic growth has been weakening over successive years, despite repeated rounds of central bank stimulus; medium term risks are increasing. Major progress still needs to be made to eliminate excess industrial capacity and the stock of unsold property, and to address the level of non-performing loans in the banking and shadow banking systems. In addition, there still needs to be a greater switch from investment in industrial capacity, property construction and infrastructure to consumer goods production.

JAPAN - has been struggling to stimulate consistent significant GDP growth and to get inflation up to its target of 2%, despite huge monetary and fiscal stimulus. It is also making little progress on fundamental reform of the economy.

WORLD GROWTH. Until recent years, world growth has been boosted by increasing **globalisation** i.e. countries specialising in producing goods and commodities in which they have an economic advantage and which they then trade with the rest of the world. This has boosted worldwide productivity and growth, and, by lowering costs, has also depressed inflation. However, the rise of China as an economic superpower over the last thirty years, which now accounts for nearly 20% of total world GDP, has unbalanced the world economy. The Chinese government has targeted achieving major world positions in specific key sectors and products, especially high-tech areas and production of rare earth minerals used in high tech products. It is achieving this by massive financial support, (i.e. subsidies), to state owned firms, government directions to other firms, technology theft, restrictions on market access by foreign firms and informal targets for the domestic market share of Chinese producers in the selected sectors. This is regarded as being unfair competition that is putting western firms at an unfair disadvantage or even putting some out of business. It is also regarded with suspicion on the political front as China is an authoritarian country that is not averse to using economic and military power for political advantage. The current trade war between the US and China therefore needs to be seen against that backdrop. It is, therefore, likely that we are heading into a period where there will be a **reversal of world globalisation and a decoupling of western countries** from dependence on China to supply products. This is likely to produce a backdrop in the coming years of weak global growth and so weak inflation. **Central banks are, therefore, likely to come under more pressure to support growth by looser monetary policy measures and this will militate against central banks increasing interest rates**.

The trade war between the US and China is a major concern to **financial markets** due to the synchronised general weakening of growth in the major economies of the world, compounded by fears that there could even be a recession looming up in the US, though this is probably overblown. These concerns resulted in **government bond yields** in the developed world falling significantly during 2019. If there were a major worldwide downturn in growth, central banks in most of the major economies will have limited ammunition available, in terms of monetary policy measures, when rates are already very low in most countries, (apart from the US). There are also concerns about how much distortion of financial markets has already occurred with the current levels of quantitative easing purchases of debt by central banks and the use of negative central bank rates in some countries. The latest PMI survey statistics of economic health for the US, UK, EU and China have all been predicting a downturn in growth; this confirms investor sentiment that the outlook for growth during the year ahead is weak.

INTEREST RATE FORECASTS

The interest rate forecasts provided by Link Asset Services in paragraph 3.3 are **predicated on an assumption of an agreement being reached on Brexit between the UK and the EU.** On this basis, while GDP growth is likely to be subdued in 2019 and 2020 due to all the uncertainties around Brexit depressing consumer and business confidence, an agreement on the detailed terms of a trade deal is likely to lead to a boost to the rate of growth in subsequent years which could, in turn, increase inflationary pressures in the economy and so cause the Bank of England to resume a series of gentle increases in Bank Rate. Just how fast, and how far, those increases will occur and rise to, will be data dependent. The forecasts in this report assume a modest recovery in the rate and timing of stronger growth and in the corresponding response by the Bank in raising rates.

- In the event of an **orderly non-agreement exit in December 2020**, it is likely that the Bank of England would take action to cut Bank Rate from 0.75% in order to help economic growth deal with the adverse effects of this situation. This is also likely to cause short to medium term gilt yields to fall.
- If there was a **disorderly Brexit**, then any cut in Bank Rate would be likely to last for a longer period and also depress short and medium gilt yields

correspondingly. Quantitative easing could also be restarted by the Bank of England. It is also possible that the government could act to protect economic growth by implementing fiscal stimulus.

The balance of risks to the UK

- The overall balance of risks to economic growth in the UK is probably even, but dependent on a successful outcome of negotiations on a trade deal.
- The balance of risks to increases in Bank Rate and shorter term PWLB rates are broadly similarly to the downside.
- In the event that a Brexit deal was agreed with the EU and approved by Parliament, the balance of risks to economic growth and to increases in Bank Rate is likely to change to the upside.

One risk that is both an upside and downside risk, is that all central banks are now working in very different economic conditions than before the 2008 financial crash as there has been a major increase in consumer and other debt due to the exceptionally low levels of borrowing rates that have prevailed since 2008. This means that the neutral rate of interest in an economy, (i.e. the rate that is neither expansionary nor deflationary), is difficult to determine definitively in this new environment, although central banks have made statements that they expect it to be much lower than before 2008. Central banks could therefore either over or under do increases in central interest rates.

Downside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates currently include:

- **Brexit** – if it were to cause significant economic disruption and a major downturn in the rate of growth.
- **Bank of England** takes action too quickly, or too far, over the next three years to raise Bank Rate and causes UK economic growth, and increases in inflation, to be weaker than we currently anticipate.
- A resurgence of the **Eurozone sovereign debt crisis.** In 2018, Italy was a major concern due to having a populist coalition government which made a lot of anti-austerity and anti-EU noise. However, in September 2019 there was a major change in the coalition governing Italy which has brought to power a much more EU friendly government; this has eased the pressure on Italian bonds. Only time will tell whether this new coalition based on an unlikely alliance of two very different parties will endure.
- Weak capitalisation of some **European banks**, particularly Italian banks.
- **German minority government.** In the German general election of September 2017, Angela Merkel's CDU party was left in a vulnerable minority position dependent on the fractious support of the SPD party, as a result of the rise in popularity of the anti-immigration AfD party. The CDU has done badly in recent state elections, but the SPD has done particularly badly, and this has raised a major question mark over continuing to support the CDU. Angela Merkel has stepped down from being the CDU party leader, but she intends to remain as Chancellor until 2021.
- **Other minority EU governments.** Austria, Finland, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Netherlands and Belgium also have vulnerable minority governments dependent on coalitions which could prove fragile.
- **Austria, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary** now form a strongly anti-immigration bloc within the EU. There has also been rising anti-immigration sentiment in Germany and France.
- In October 2019, the IMF issued a report on the World Economic Outlook which flagged up a synchronised slowdown in world growth. However, it also flagged up that there was **potential for a rerun of the 2008 financial crisis**, but his time centred on the huge debt binge accumulated by corporations during the decade of low interest rates. This now means that there are corporates who would be unable to cover basic interest costs on **some $19trn of corporate debt in major western economies,** if world

growth was to dip further than just a minor cooling. This debt is mainly held by the shadow banking sector i.e. pension funds, insurers, hedge funds, asset managers etc., who, when there is $15trn of corporate and government debt now yielding negative interest rates, have been searching for higher returns in riskier assets. Much of this debt is only marginally above investment grade so any rating downgrade could force some holders into a fire sale, which would then depress prices further and so set off a spiral down. The IMF's answer is to suggest imposing higher capital charges on lending to corporates and for central banks to regulate the investment operations of the shadow banking sector. In October 2019, the deputy Governor of the Bank of England also flagged up the dangers of banks and the shadow banking sector lending to corporates, especially highly leveraged corporates, which had risen back up to near pre-2008 levels.
- **Geopolitical risks,** for example in North Korea, but also in Europe and the Middle East, which could lead to increasing safe haven flows.

Upside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates
- **Brexit** – if agreement was reached all round that removed all threats of economic and political disruption between the EU and the UK.
- The **Bank of England is too slow** in its pace and strength of increases in Bank Rate and, therefore, allows inflationary pressures to build up too strongly within the UK economy, which then necessitates a later rapid series of increases in Bank Rate faster than we currently expect.
- **UK inflation,** whether domestically generated or imported, returning to sustained significantly higher levels causing an increase in the inflation premium inherent to gilt yields.

APPENDIX 5

Appendix 2: Approved countries for investments

AA

- United Kingdom
- France

AAA

- Australia
- Canada
- Denmark
- Germany
- Luxembourg
- Netherlands
- Norway
- Singapore
- Sweden
- Switzerland